

Mode of Global Production and Islamic Culture Of Violence

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Introduction

According to one group of scholars, the economic, political and cultural changes in the late 20th century did not have a major effect on the internal relations between the political and the cultural/religious structures in the Islamic world. Ernest Gellner emphasized that the process of secularization in industrialized society did not provoke much of a response in the Islamic community. Moreover, the influence of Islam on the feelings and beliefs of his followers increased.¹

Another group of prominent scholars, however, came to the conclusion that the global changes in the late 20th century had a significant impact on the creation of ideas about the necessity to change the relationship between the political and the cultural/religious structures in the Islamic world. Famous Saudi Islamologist Abubaker A. Bagader, professor at King Abdul Aziz University, in his studies of the Islamic ideal in the historical context

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¹Ernest Gellner, foreword to Akbar S. Ahmed and Hastings Donnan (1994), "Islam, Globalization and Post-modernity".

of global structural changes, emphasized that the main problem in Islam is not the awareness that the Islamic community has to be changed. The main question is what kind of changes need to be made, and how fast and in what way they can be realized. And while some appeal to gradual and peaceful change involving the education and social activity of the masses and their active participation in political life, with respect and appreciation for the legal system and the state as a guarantor of peace and order, others are seeking faster and violent revolutionary change with the establishment of a new global revolutionary Islamic order.²

According to this view, the contemporary crisis of the territorial identity of the state has caused intensive cultural vibrations in Islamic countries, resulting in a dramatic confrontation between the state and society in the Islamic world.

Global structural changes require a new space for fluctuations of capital, labor, information and the creative linking behind new knowledge and technology, which has brought about a major crisis in international relations, seeking a new global order in which the state no longer plays a central role in creating the interests and identity of social groups. Since historically the state in the Islamic world was more the agent of the interests of foreign capital rather than that of the interactions between the identity and interests in the Islamic community, this will lead to a serious identity crisis of the state in the Islamic world. As the individual and group identity in Islam is primarily associated with the identity of the global Islamic community of believers (umma), and not with the territorial-political identity of the Islamic state (Watan), whose borders were decreed by the former colonial powers, the “crisis of the territorial identity of the state” in the Islamic world will be automatically transferred into an internal conflict between the state and society in Islam.³ The remarkable complexity of this conflict will create a new fragile relationship between Islamic and Western civilizations, which are often on the brink of conflict.

The state in Islam has failed to initiate the modernization process of Islamic society and to incorporate the Islamic state into the modern

²Abu Baker A. Bagader (1994), *Contemporary Islamic Movements in the Arabic World*, in Akbar S. Ahmed and Hastings Donnan (eds.1994), “Islam, Globalization and Postmodernity”, Routledge, str.120), see also Fouad Ajami *The Summoning*, Foreign Affairs, Vol 72, no. 4, 1993.

³“For a Muslims, the fundamental attachment is not to the watan (home-land), but to the umma, or community of believers, all made equal in their submission to Allah. This universal confraternity supersedes the institutions of the nation-state, which is seen as a source of division among believers”. (Manuel Castells (2010), *The Power of Identity*, p. 15)

capitalist mode of production. The inability of the state to include the Islamic community in the modernization process has caused great social frustration in the Islamic society, which has in turn further pushed the identity of the Islamic state towards the global Islamic community of believers (umma). In this process the Global Islamic Radical Militant Movement (GIRMM) and the process of the purification of Islam has become one of the biggest challenges to the identity of the nation-state in the Islamic world in the late 20th and early 21st centuries.

As “collective identity” implies that the “group identity” is derived from the social and political interactions and specific interests of the community, the identity of Islam has grown into a “global collective identity”. Therefore the “identity crisis of the state” in Islam will automatically generate a new dynamic of political vibrations in the relations between Islam and the West. Hence, any inclination towards a global integration of Islam will be seen as a global threat to the liberal democracy of the West and to international order.⁴

Global structural changes will lead to the formation of a new global order in which the global community has a propensity to generate new global interests and a new cultural identity. Within this new cultural identity the position and the role of Islamic identity will be designed on the structure of global relationships in the new global order. What kind of global relationships will develop in this new global order primarily depends on whether the new global order will be dominated by the “Collective Identity of Violence” (The Hobbesian culture), the “Collective Identity of Rivalry” (The Lockean culture), or the “Collective Identity of Friendship” (The Kantian culture). In those prospects it is possible to conceive two models of structural relations between Islam and the West in the future.

Islam between the Culture of Violence and the Culture of Tolerance

One of those concepts views the relationship between Islam and the West inherently in the form of Hobbes’s (Hobbesian) anarchic “culture of conflict”. In this concept of globalization, the market economy, new flows

⁴See more in: Graham E. Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam*, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2002, pp. 48-60; Mahmud A. Faksh, *The Prospects of Islamic Fundamentalism in the Post-Gulf War Period*, International Journal XLIX Spring 1994, pp183-218; John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality*, New York Oxford University Press, 1992; Emmanuel Sivan, *The Holy War Tradition in Islam*, Orbis, Spring 1998, pp. 171-194; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Simon and Schuster, Sydney, pp. 1-367; Judith Miller, *The Challenge of Radical Islam*, Foreign Affairs, Spring 1993, pp. 43-56;

of capital, new ideas, new technology, and new social and political relations between nations, are strictly interlinked in the global community. From this perspective, globalization is defined in terms of technological and socio-economic determinism. Within this global framework, a new social environment including the new model of techno-culture, new community identity, the new triumph of the free market, a new model of democracy and a new generation of human rights and freedoms, was required. Such a determination of globalization opens up new opportunities for the further development of democratization, a new model of communication, education and culture, and the growth of many other social benefits which are arising from the global structural changes, which in turn require changes to the philosophical and cultural matrix of identity, which is on the path of global integration.

Proceeding from the technological-economic determinism of globalization, a group of Western scholars believe that this concept of globalization inherently excludes Islam as an equal participant in this process. In accordance with this view recent years have seen a revival of the neo-Weberian attribution of economic prosperity to religious thought. In this new interpretation Islam has been seen as the inhibitor of economic development. In this view Muslims are the most “anti-market” people.⁵ For them, the process of globalization is a combination of technological, economic, social, ideological, and cultural factors that make up a unique homogenized matrix of large corporations in developed nations and global institutions with which Islam, with its inner social restrictions and cultural inhibitions, is not compatible.⁶ For this group of scholars, the identity of Islam, which is devoted to the glorification of force and violence, which is embedded in the very philosophy and practice of Islam, is not compatible with the requirements arising from the globalization process. These authors underline that the relationship between globalization and Islam is one of permanent mutual resistance, repression and restrictions.⁷

⁵Marcusa Nolasn & Howard Pack (2004), Islam, Globalization and Economic Performance, in the Middle East, International Economics Policy Briefs, Number PBO4-4, June 2004). See also Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales. 2002. *People's Opium? Religion and Economic Activities*. NBER Working Paper 9237. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research; Kuran, Timur. Forthcoming. *Islam and Mammon*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Noland, Marcus. 2003. *Religion, Culture, and Economic Performance*. Institute for International Economics Working Paper 03-8. Washington: Institute for International Economics.

⁶Jeremy Brecher & Tim Costelo (2000), Globalization from Bellow, South and Press 2000

⁷Shireen T. Hunter (1998), *The Future of Islam and the West: Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence?*, London, Praeger, p. 71

Another group, mostly Islamic scholars, who depart from the cultural dimension of Islam, have a similar approach to the relations between Islam and the West. In their opinion, Islamic democracy has been seen as the rule of God's law but not the law of man. "The belief in the Unity and Sovereignty of Allah is the foundation of the social and moral system propounded by the prophets. It is the very starting point of the Islamic political philosophy. The basic principle of Islam is that human beings must, individually and collectively, surrender all rights of overlordship, legislation and exercising of authority over others. No one should be allowed to pass orders or make commands in his own right and no one ought to accept the obligation to carry out such commands and obey such orders. No one is entitled to make laws on his own authority and no one is obliged to abide by them. This right vests in Allah alone".⁸

The principles of "shura" are obligatory principles and the main sources of Islamic ethics. Shura is basically a consultative decision-making process that is considered either obligatory or desirable by different scholars. Those who choose to emphasize the Quranic verse "and consult with them on the matter" (3:159) consider shura as obligatory, but those who emphasize the verse praising "those who conduct their affairs by counsel" (43:38) consider shura as merely desirable. There is no doubt that shura is the Islamic way of making decisions, but is it obligatory? Does a government that does not implement a consultative process become illegitimate? We do not have a decisive answer to this question.⁹

In accordance with Islamic law, sovereignty belongs only to God, who transfers sovereignty to the people. Every individual and group has a duty of loyalty to God and not to the state to which they belong.¹⁰ The absolute personal sovereignty of God in Islam means that sovereignty is extended to where Muslims live. The relationship between Islam and non-Islamic states seems conflicting and incompatible with the globalization process.¹¹

In the opinion of this group of lawyers, social scientists, and ethicists, the "sovereignty of God" is a universal and transcendent principle of Islamic jurisprudence and political theory, which makes an essential distinction

⁸Sayyid Abul 'Ala Mawdudi, *Islamic Law and Constitution* 136-37 (Khurshid Ahmad trans. & ed. 2d ed., 1960).

⁹Muqtedar Khan (2002), USIP, Special Report, September 2002.

¹⁰M.A. Muqtedar Khan, in Khaled Abou El Fadl (2004), *Islam and the Challenge of Democracy*, Princeton, University Press, pp. 139

¹¹Majid Khadduri (1966), *The Islamic Law of Nations*, The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Maryland, p. 10

between Western liberal democracy and Islam. In this opinion the incompatibility of Islam and liberal democracy is apparent.

In this concept the relationship between Islam and the West is one of the “culture of hostility” with the mutually exclusive identity of both Islamic and Western civilizations.

Another concept of the relationship between the identities of Islam and Western civilization is based on the changes that occur as a result of global structural changes and the impact of these changes on the interests and identities of these civilizations. According to this view the importance of Islam in global relations in the near future will not be so determined by the geostrategic position of Islamic countries on whose territory there are huge deposits of natural non-renewable resources—oil, and the nature of the relationship between Islam and the West will change. In the process of global structural changes, Islam becomes increasingly important as a system of cultural values of 1.5 billion people in the world. Hence the interest of the West to cooperate with Islam is increasingly moving from the geo-strategic position of Islamic countries as a source of oil, to the capacity of absorption (consumers) of the Islamic world. Those changes of interest, which stem from the new relationship between global producers and local consumers necessarily lead to a new relationship between Islam and the West. In this new relationship of mutual interests and cooperation between Islam and the West, the nature of the relations between these civilizations will be significantly altered.

In this prospect of the future development of relations in the global community, the relationship between Islamic and Western civilizations will be based on the concept of the “culture of tolerance and cooperation”, and principles of nonviolence, and the interests for mutual respect will prevail. Faster and more fluid communication between different identities/interests with less fear of domination from each other will mean that cooperation between Islam and the West could be more efficacious and more peaceful.¹²

Islam from Cultural to Political Identity

The relations between the West and Islam in the past were generally based on the legacy of colonialism in Islamic countries. The internal

¹²Peter Katzenstein (ed. 1996), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press

religious traditional fragmentation of Islam (Sunni and Shiia Islam),¹³ and the influence of Islam as a religion on internal political and social processes, have moved the Islamic world beyond the influence of the social and political changes which affected the international community in the 19th and 20th centuries.

The influence of the West on the Islamic World had a direct impact on social and cultural stratification in the Islamic community, resulting in a lack of fundamental social changes, which prevented the formation of national identity in these countries. Secular nationalism, which sporadically appeared in the form of liberal and Arab nationalism, failed to create prosperous and powerful communities in the Islamic world. “The secular national ideologies and movements that rallied millions across the Arab worlds in the immediate post-colonial era—Nasserism, Ba’thism, and their corollaries, Arab nationalism and Arab unity—have failed. The old ideologies of nationalism, socialism and National Socialism, bequeathed by nineteenth and twentieth-century Europe, have lost their magic and even become discredited. They have failed to deliver on their promises of national strength, social and economic development, and political freedom”.¹⁴

Authoritarian governments in Islamic countries, which mainly rely on outside political support and on fragmentation in Islam, never had political and religious authority for the radical social reform of the Islamic community. The majority of Muslims are Sunni, being over 75–90% of all Muslims. The second largest sect, Shia, makes up 10–20%. About 13% of Muslims live in Indonesia, the largest Muslim country, 25% in South Asia, 20% in the Middle East, 2% in Central Asia, 4% in the remaining South East Asian countries, and 15% in Sub-Saharan Africa. Sizable communities are also found in China, Russia, and parts of Europe. With over 1.5 billion followers or over 22% of earth's population, Islam is the second-largest and one of the fastest-growing religions in the world.

¹³Today in Islam exist numerous factions and movements so that the Islamic spectrum represents a number of organizations, movements, teachings and sects. Here we present only one of the typology encountered in the literature on modern Islam: 1. Islamic Secularism; 2. Islamic Populism; 3. Islamic Philanthropist; 4. Islamic Spiritualism (Sufi Passivism, Sufi Activism); 5. Political Islamism Sunni: Puritan Traditionalist, Mainstream Gradualist, Revolutionary Messianic, Revolutionary Jihadist, Reformist Revisionist, Modernist Rationalist; 6. Political Islamist Shi'i: Revolutionary Marji'ist, Reformist Gradualist; 7. Official Islam; 8. Major Branches of Islam: Sunni, Ithna 'ashari, Isma'ili, Zaidi, Nusayri, Druz, Ibadi (R.Hrain Dekmejin, “Multiple Faces of Islam”, in A. Jerichow and J. Beak Simonsen (eds. 1997), *Islam in Changing World*, str.3

¹⁴Mahmud A Faksh (1994), *The Prospects of Islamic Fundamentalism in the Post-Gulf War Period*, *International Journal XLIX* (Spring 1994), p. 186

The corrupt and repressive military and police apparatus in Islamic countries, which largely depended on both the military and political support of the West, did not have either the capacity or the legitimacy to undertake measures of internal social, political and economic reforms. “Since independence, these countries have been largely under the sway of various forms of authoritarian rule: military-bureaucratic dictatorship, single-party state hegemony, or traditional monarchic autocracy. This pattern was interrupted only briefly by a few short-lived experiments with representative democracy that soon succumbed to what is ‘normal’. Today there is no Arab state that fits under the rubric ‘democratic’ in the Western sense. The reality of present day Arab Muslim politics is best characterized as hegemonic state structures superimposed on emasculated societies”.¹⁵ The powerlessness of governments in Islamic countries to bring the community to a higher level of economic development, to reduce the gap between extremely wealthy and extremely poor populations, and to eliminate corruption in these countries, will increase the strengthening and influence of Global Islamic Radical Militant Movements (GIRMM). The strengthening of GIRMM on the political scene in the Islamic world has been more the result of the lack of skills and interests of Islamic political elites to create a modern social and economic program in Islamic countries,¹⁶ than that of the growing influence of Islamic radical militant movements.¹⁷

During the Cold War secular nationalism was on the rise in the Islamic world and became a big threat to the Islamic regimes. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the cooperation of Islamic regimes with the governments of Western countries will occupy a central place in the program of GIRMM, which will recognize in this cooperation the main opportunity for successfully confrontation with the pro-Western oriented regimes in Islamic countries.¹⁸

¹⁵Mahmud A. Faksh (1994), *The Prospects of Islamic Fundamentalism in the Post-Gulf War Period*, International Journal XLIX (Spring 1994), pp. 192-193

¹⁶Arab Human Development Report 2002, *Creating Opportunities for Future Generations*, 2003, *Building a Knowledge Society*, 2004, *Freedom and Good Governance* (New York: United Nations Development Program).

¹⁷“Islamic revivalism is in many ways the successor to failed nationalist programs. The founders of many Islamic movements were formerly participants in nationalist movements: Hasan al-Banna of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Rashid Ghannoushi of Tunisia’s Renaissance party, and Abbasi Madani of the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria.” (John L. Esposito, *Political Islam: Beyond the Green Menace*, Current History, January 1994, p. 20)

¹⁸Graham E. Fuller (2002), *The Future of Political Islam*, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2002, pp. 48-60

The change in the focus of the GIRMM's program has caused great confusion in the strategies of the political opposition in Islamic countries as well as in those of new Islamic Revival Movements (IRMs). This confusion became particularly visible in the Islamic world after the outbreak of the war against "global terrorism" at the beginning of this century. In that period new IRMs faced great historical challenges. Islamic modernism and revival are two of the many intellectual responses, operating within the Islamic framework, to Western colonial influence and to the eighteenth-century political decline of Muslim powers. Islamic modernists, while acknowledging with varying degrees of criticism or emulation, the technological, scientific and legal achievements of the West, aimed to overcome a perceived impasse in the development of Islamic societies. Islamic revivalists objected to the Western colonial exploitation of Muslim countries and the imposition of Western secular values. They aimed to reassert "original" Islamic values. Islamic modernist ideas promoted a re-interpretation of Islam which would fit in with the modern world.

For many modernists, the reason why Islam suffered such a global decline lies in the lack, in Muslim countries, of a modern and dynamic understanding of science. While condemning European colonial aggression and opposing its political domination of Muslim countries, Islamic modernists called for reforms in the field of education, demanding modern curricula combining religion with modern sciences and the need to acquire the tools of modern science to combat the West.¹⁹

New IRMs are both a response to the conditions of modernity—to the centralization of state power and the feeble development of capitalist economies—and a cultural expression of modernity in Islamic countries. The emphasis upon Islamic values is not intended as a return to some past era but represents an effort to cope with contemporary problems by renewed commitments to the basic principles, though not the historical details, of Islam.²⁰

The War on Global Terrorism: Back to the Past

However, the global war on terrorism will unfold in the main support for a centralized authoritarian state in Islamic countries, which will weaken the possibilities of democratic reform, posing a grave threat to the further

¹⁹*Atlas of the World's Religions, Second Edition*

²⁰Ira M. Lapidus (1997), Islamic Revival and Modernity: The Contemporary Movements and the Historical Paradigm, *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, vol. 40, no. 4 (1997), pp. 444-460

development of free and democratic elections in the Islamic world. It will worsen the position of the Islamic world in the global democratic changes.²¹

The war against global terrorism will increasingly reinforce the position of oppressive authoritarian regimes in Islamic countries. Strengthening the position of these oppressive regimes will in turn create more opportunities for stronger and more open actions on the part of GIRMM, leading to the domination of radical streams in new IRMs. This process will result in an increasingly dangerous coalition between GIRMM and new IRMs which will additionally impede the possibility of democratic changes in Islam. The risk posed by this coalition within Islam will support the further strengthening of alliances between the authoritarian regimes in Islamic countries and the governments of Western countries under the semblance of combating “Islamic terrorism”, giving rise to more pronounced confrontation between IRMs, GIRMM and authoritarian regimes in Islamic countries.

This intra-Islamic confusion will become an indicator of the wider international confrontation between Islam and the West, which gained special implications after the terrorist attacks of the Islamic terrorist All Qaeda network on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, and the US and Great Britain invasion of Iraq (2003-2011), Libya, and Syria, which led to the escalation of political tensions between the West and Iran, with dramatic effects in the Islamic community. This intra-Islamic political perplexity in the early 21st century can certainly be labeled the worst stage in relations between Islam and the West in history. Among Western nations, assessments of Muslim-Western relations are especially negative in France, Germany and Spain. In all three countries, roughly six-in-ten say

²¹“Democracy promotion policies in Islamic world also reflect a lack of understanding. The equation of democratic reforms with free parliamentary elections assumes the intrinsic legitimacy of formal political institutions as an arena in which national actors can negotiate interests and resolve conflicts facing the community. Yet every survey conducted in Muslim societies, including Arab, non-Arab, African, and Asian countries, suggests that they harbor deep and widespread suspicion of formal political authority. This suspicion is unlikely to disappear with the democratization of the political process. Throughout Islamic history, political leaders have not enjoyed the esteem granted to religious scholars, tribal chiefs, or mystics who kept a distance from state power. One lesson to be drawn from Iraq, for example, is that the formal political process, which privileges majority rule over traditional consensus, might not be the best mechanism for negotiating divisive substantive issues. Religious councils, tribal chiefs, charismatic leaders, local assemblies, and similar informal bodies can be more effective in reinforcing political legitimacy through popular consultation, negotiation, and concessions” *Abdeslam M. Maghraoui (2006)*, American Foreign Policy and Islamic Renewal, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 164, July 2006)

relations between Muslims and people in Western nations such as the United States and Europe are poor. Somewhat fewer in Britain (52%) and the U.S. (48%) hold this view. The percentage of Russians describing relations as bad has fallen 15 points since 2006, and notable declines have also taken place in Britain (-9 points), Germany (-9), the U.S. (-7), and France (-4). Of all the publics surveyed, Palestinian Muslims offer the most negative assessments of Muslim-Western relations (72% bad), although roughly six-in-ten Muslims in Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt and Jordan feel this way. Only 45% of Pakistani Muslims say relations are bad, although this is up from 25% in 2006; 8% say relations are neither good nor bad and fully 29% have no opinion on this question. Indonesia is the exception among the Muslim publics surveyed. Just 41% of Indonesian Muslims say relations are bad, down from 54% five years ago; 43% currently believe relations between Muslims and Westerners are good. When Westerners who characterize relations as bad are asked who is responsible, they tend to say Muslims. This is especially true in France, where 56% of those describing relations as poor place most of the blame on Muslims. About half in Spain (49%) blame Muslims, up from 32% five years ago. Roughly half (48%) also hold this view in Germany. About four in ten Russians (41%) who think relations are bad primarily blame Muslims. Somewhat fewer express this opinion in Britain (34%). While 40% of Americans who describe relations as bad blame Muslims, this view is much more common among Republicans (60%) than Democrats (33%) or independents (32%). Many Westerners hold their own countries responsible. More than one-quarter in the U.S. (29%), Russia (27%), France (26%), and Britain (26%) place most of the blame on people in Western countries. In Spain (29%), Germany (24%), and Britain (24%) many volunteer that both sides share responsibility for the poor state of relations. Among Muslims who say relations are bad, majorities in six of seven nations think Westerners are mostly to blame. This view is especially common in the non-Arab nations surveyed: Turkey (75%), Indonesia (74%), and Pakistan (72%). In the four Arab nations, significant minorities volunteer that Jews are primarily to blame, including 35% of Lebanese Muslims. Across the Muslim publics included in the survey, fewer than one-in-five believe Muslims are mostly to blame for the poor state of relation.²²

²²Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes & Trends, The Rift Between Muslims and the West, July 21, 2011. On the issue of West-Islam relations see more in Samuel P. Huntington (1996), *The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of World Order*

Two hypotheses have prevailed in the GIRMM strategy. The first hypothesis emphasized that the West was now more willing to fight on the side of the rich against the poor in order to gain easier access to Islamic oil. The proponents of this hypothesis pointed out that in order to implement this strategy the West's military presence in Islamic countries is now more visible than it was during the Cold War. The second hypothesis, which is widely exploited and actively used in the global strategy of GIRMM, declared Western countries more inclined to intervene in conflicts within the Islamic world which solve internal problems in Islamic society, while avoiding involvement in those between Muslims and non-Muslims, in which Muslims suffer.²³

Using these two hypotheses GIRMM will gain sympathy in the wider population in the Islamic world, which will push the IRMs further away from social and democratic reforms towards a strategy of internal political and military struggle. This change will result in the marginalization of social changes in its program and strategy, which will further deepen internal social contradictions in Islamic countries, thus promoting sectarian confrontation.

These processes in the Islamic world, which came to the fore after the so-called “Arab spring”, will lead to political confrontation, but not to social transformation and democratic changes in the Islamic World. This will move Islamic identity from cultural and social references to political ones, which may prove to be one of the main obstructions to the successful inclusion of Islam in global structural changes.

Islam between Identity and Democratization

In its political and social program the new IRMs primarily relies on the systematic rationalization of Islamic doctrines, institutions and practices in the implementation of Islamic law (Sharia), interpreting Islam as a symbiosis of beliefs, rituals, ideology and politics, with the comprehensive impact of Sharia on the overall life of the individual and community. “In general, the Islamic renewal movement comprises four broad groups. Proponents of ‘civic Islam’ include civil society organizations that advocate women’s equality, human rights, social responsibility, environmental protection, and similar social issues but make no overt claim to political power. Referring to the progressive teachings of Islam, they call on regimes to enact reforms and respect basic rights. Proponents of ‘Islam and democracy’ include parties and movements that see no incompatibility

²³Ghassan Salame (2003), “Islam and the West”, *Foreign Policy* 90, (Spring 1993), p. 28.

between Islamic values and teachings and modern democratic principles. This group advocates participation in the political process with the goal of achieving power and applying political reforms on the basis of Islamic principles. Proponents of ‘reforms within Islam’ include leading religious figures, scholars, and academic institutions that call for reinterpretation of Islamic laws, a historical reading of Islam and the Qur’an, and the modernization of Islamic knowledge. ‘Culturally modern Islam’ developed mainly among Muslim communities living in the West. These diaspora groups and organizations, which try to articulate a ‘western Islamic identity’ see no tension between being a Muslim and a citizen of a western democracy. Tying these diverse actors together is their commitment to modernize Islamic institutions, traditions, and practices.”²⁴

The decisive goal of these movements will remain the preservation of the identity of the Islamic world, the political and social reconstruction of the Islamic community, and a rejection of the cultural and political influence of the West in Islamic countries. “Today, however, the major battle is over the soul of Islam and will require substantive, normative, and institutional reforms. The outcome of this religious and ideological contest will be determined by the balance of power and influence between radical Islamists, bent on imposing a puritanical form of Islam through intimidation and violence, and moderate Muslims who aim to renew Islam from within.”²⁵

Drawing social power primarily from the middle class, with its political agenda the new IRMs has attracted sympathy primarily from younger generations of highly educated people. Through the activities of these movements young people were able to find an outlet for their political actions which are directed towards political and social changes in the Islamic world.²⁶

²⁴Abdeslam M. Maghraoui (2006), American Foreign Policy and Islamic Renewal, United State Institute of Peace (USIP), Special Report 164, July 2006)

²⁵Abdeslam M. Maghraoui (2006), American Foreign Policy and Islamic Renewal, United State Institute of Peace, Special Report 164, July 2006)

²⁶“As a strategy, “Islamic renewal” can bring coherence to a significant but scattered cluster of Muslim reformist ideas and tie them to a social and political agenda that includes reform of family codes to give women equal rights; revisions of textbooks to teach human rights and religious pluralism; and modernization of Islamic charities, schools, and consultative traditions. The movement is already a fact on the ground. Various influential Arab and Muslim reformists, including secular human rights and women’s groups, consider modernist Islamic values as a means to advocate broad-based social and political change”. Abdeslam M. Maghraoui (2006), American Foreign Policy and Islamic Renewal, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report, No. 164, July 2006)

Welfare and social reform in the Islamic world have played the most important role in spreading the cultural influence of this civilization from the earliest days of its creation. The entire history of Islamic civilization is characterized by the permanent renewal (*tajdid*), reform (*Islah*), and renaissance (*Nahda*) of this great religion and civilization. In the early stage of Islam, egalitarianism and the democratic dimensions of social and human equality, which were especially promoted in the speeches of the Prophet Muhammad (*Hadith*), were accentuated. With the expansion of Islam, as the dominant empire of the Middle Ages, in those areas inhabited by people with different cultural identities, the need for a high degree of flexibility of Islamic canons was apparent, which led to a real renaissance in reinterpreting the Qur'an and the practice of Islam (*Sunna*). Different schools of Islamic jurisprudence have been introduced into the interpretation of the Qur'an, such as Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki and Shafi'i, within Sunni Islam, and Jafari within Shi'a Islam.

Of special significance in the political philosophy of Islam was the development of different social categories such as the category of common goods (*maslaha `amma*), that of compassion (*rahmah*), the category of human welfare (*masali'h al-'Ibad*), the protection of religious minorities (*ahl al-dhima*), social justice (*'adl*), and numerous other social institutions which outlined the specific identity of Islam as a global philosophical, political and social concept. These social categories have linked Islam with the modern philosophical and humanitarian concept of modern society from the earliest days of its development. Through developing the principles of consensus (*ijma'*) and consultation methods (*Shura*) in decision-making processes, which were founded on the legal system (*Haqq*), the system of invention (*talfiq*), the model of reasoning based on the principles of analogy in the Qur'anic verses (*kiyas*), and *ijtihad*, as the process of interpreting the Qur'an and independent decision-making, have grown into a defining component of the identity of Islamic culture as a modern political-philosophical concept of democracy.

Although the Qur'an did not specify a particular form of government, a system of social and political standards, which had to be followed by all Muslims, was specified. "Among such values ordained by the Qur'an are: the promotion of social cooperation and mutual assistance in pursuit of justice, the establishment of a consultative and non-autocratic method of governance, and the institutionalization of mercy and compassion in social interactions. Therefore, it would stand to reason that Muslims ought to adopt

the system of government that is the most effective in helping Muslims to promote the pertinent values” facilitated by Islamic law and ethics.²⁷

The large territorial and political transformation of the Islamic world after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was to dictate the appearance of modern Islamic states which regulated mutual political relations on the principles of the territorial and political sovereignty of the state in accordance with the norms of secular public international law and international relations.²⁸ However, the territorial and political changes in the Islamic world were not accompanied by compatible changes in the internal jurisprudence and legal tradition of Islam. These changes were to create a dichotomy between international legal norms and the standards of internal legal jurisprudence of Islam, thus generating a moral and ethic divide between Islam and the West.²⁹

Although many aspects of the political relations between Islamic countries were governed by secular international legal norms, the Islamic identity is still intimately associated with the global Islamic community (umma), rather than with the state as was case in Western civilization. Many aspects of human rights, women rights, marital rights, divorce, inheritance rights, and the rights of the child, are still governed by Islamic law and

²⁷Khaled Abou El-Fadl (2003), *Islam and the Challenge of Democratic Commitment*, Fordham International Law Journal, Volume 27, Issue 1 2003 Article 2)

²⁸Abdeslam Maghraoui (2003), “Ambiguities of Sovereignty: Morocco, The Hague and the Western Sahara Dispute,” *Mediterranean Politics*, 2003, pp. 113-26.

²⁹Abd al-Hamid Abu Sulayman (1987), *The Islamic Theory of International Relations: New Directions for Islamic Methodology and Thought* (Herndon, VA: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1987).

traditions, often interpreted in the West as part of Sharia law, which remains incompatible with the secular legal system of the West.³⁰

This legal dichotomy between international law and Islamic jurisprudence, combined with that between the ethics, traditions and moral Islamic values, which must be followed by all Muslims, on one side, and the ethic, moral and traditional values of Western democracy, on the other, will lead to the creation of a general understanding in the West that every demand made by the masses in Islamic countries to change the social and political agenda in the Islamic community through the imposing form of government which could exert the social and political values of Islamic policy, means nothing more than establishing the legitimacy of a global conservative Islamic government and imposing Sharia Law. With such a judgment, which dominates in western political and academic thought, any distinction between the ideology of the IRMs and the conservative ideology of the GIRMM will be removed.³¹ This often leads to the increase of parity between GIRMM and the IRMs, thus making social and political changes in Islamic countries practically impossible.

Al Qaeda's terrorist attack on New York and Washington, the declaration of war on global terrorism, the war in Afghanistan, the West's invasion of Iraq, Syria, and Libya, the tense relations between the US and the Arab

³⁰“Shari'ah is God's Way; it is represented by a set of normative principles, methodologies for the production of legal injunctions, and a set of positive legal rules. As is well known, Shari'ah encompasses a variety of schools of thought and approaches, which are equally valid and equally orthodox. Nevertheless, Shari'ah as a whole, with all its schools and various points of view, remains the way and law of God. The Shari'ah, for the most part, is not explicitly dictated by God. Rather, Shari'ah relies on the interpretive act of the human agent for its production and execution. Paradoxically, however, Shari'ah is the core value that society must serve. The paradox here is exemplified in the fact that there is a pronounced tension between the obligation to live by God's law and the fact that this law is manifested only through subjective interpretive determinations. Even if there is a unified realization that a particular positive command does express the Divine law, there is still a vast array of possible subjective executions and applications. This dilemma was resolved, somewhat, in Islamic discourses by distinguishing between Shari'ah and *fiqh*. Shari'ah, it was argued, is the Divine ideal, standing as if suspended in mid-air, unaffected and uncorrupted by the vagaries of life. The *fiqh* is the human attempt to understand and apply the ideal. Therefore, Shari'ah is immutable, immaculate, and lawless—*fiqh* is not”. Khaled Abou El-Fadl (2003), *Islam and the Challenge of Democratic Commitment*, Fordham International Law Journal, Volume 27, Issue 1 2003 Article 2)

³¹“The Koran and other statements of Muslim beliefs contain few prohibitions on violence, and a concept of nonviolence is absent from Muslim doctrine and practice”. (Samuel Huntington (1998), *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, London, p. 263)

League, the constant delays in resolving the biblical conflict between Palestine and Israel, and the tensions between the West and Iran regarding Iran's intentions to produce nuclear weapons,³² have all served to reinforce the alliances between the new IRMs and GIRMM, which increasingly opt for the common struggle against the Anglo-American presence in the Islamic world. This has resulted in a perceptible mutual global confrontation between the West and the Islamic world at the beginning of the 21st century.

The ongoing support of Western liberal democratic governments for the autocratic regimes in Islamic countries, making the peaceful and democratic social and political transformation of Islamic countries impossible, have forced democratic IRMs dangerously close to GIRMM, which are becoming an increasingly powerful factor on the Islamic community political scene. In the new political environment only GIRMM are capable of providing promising options for social and political changes in the Islamic world.³³

These details in internal relations with Islamic countries, and military support from Western countries to oppressive Islamic regimes, have preserved conservative Islamic systems. "By monopolizing all legitimate political activity, the governing elites pre-empted participatory politics and created a vacuum that the Islamists, as the sole leading opposition group, could fill. The lack of democracy in the region has patently served to fuel the Islamist movements."³⁴

The necessity of mutual cooperation and integration between Islamic countries, triggered by the process of global structural changes in the era of globalization, will enable radical movements in Islamic countries to successfully create a link between the unavoidability of the elimination of autocratic regimes in Islamic countries and the necessity of intensive mutual connections between them, thus making GIRMM a powerful factor in the turbulent processes in the Islamic world in the early 21st century.

The main goal of GIRMM is to open a global confrontation between the West and the Islamic world and thus weaken the relationship between the West and authoritarian regimes in Islamic countries. Their primary aim is

³²Iran vs. West Is War Inevitable in 2012. Conversation with Ambassador Jon Bolton, American Enterprise Institute, February 12, 2012.

³³Brahma Chellaney (2011), America's Troubling Support for Oil-Reach Islamist Regimes, The Japan Times, Tuesday, November 2011.

³⁴Mahmuda Faksh (1994), The Prospects of Islamic Fundamentalism in the Post-Gulf War Period, International Journal XLIX (Spring 1994), p. 193

to encourage the brutality of those who govern Islamic countries, and instill anger in those suffering in the Islamic world and so challenge the legitimacy of the ruling Islamic autocratic regimes. To create a greater disparity between the rebellion of the poor, and to provoke the brutality of the ruling military and political elites and family dynasties, who have undoubtedly enjoyed the unreserved military support of Western countries, are the GIRMM's main strategic goals.

Another strategic objective implemented by GIRMM is certainly to encourage extensive actions against basic human rights and freedoms. It is the right of each human being to enjoy freedom of movement, the right to a free and fair trial, and the right not to be considered a terrorist until legally declared so by a court of law. Nobody should be treated as a second class citizen just because they belong to another confessional, cultural or racial origin.³⁵ The goal of GIRMM is to discredit the concept of Western democratic society in the eyes of the Islamic world, to cast doubt on the democratic proclamations of the West and to discredit the legitimacy of the West to intervene in the internal affairs of the Islamic community in the name of democratic rights and freedoms.

Long queues of citizens in front of police stations in the US, waiting for a criminal investigation with the obligatory humiliating procedure of giving blood samples, photographing and fingerprinting, other mistreatments, only because they belong to the tradition and culture of Islam (after 9/11), have made GIRMM more powerful and more homogeneous in the Islamic world than ever before. Islamic State (IS) grew out of what was al-Qaeda in Iraq, which was formed by Sunni militants after the US-led invasion in 2003 and became a major force in the country's sectarian insurgency. In 2011, the group joined the rebellion against President Bashar al-Assad in Syria, where it found a safe haven and easy access to weapons. At the same time, it took advantage of the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq, as well as widespread Sunni anger at the sectarian policies of the country's Shia-led government. In 2013, the group began seizing control of territory in

³⁵During his campaign, President Trump promised to ban all Muslims outright until he could figure out "what is going on." He later explained that this idea had developed into several policies that would have the same effect. Since his inauguration, Trump has begun to implement them—they include slashing the refugee program, banning all immigration and travelers from several majority Muslim countries, and imposing new burdens on all visa applicants as part of "extreme vetting" initiatives. So far, these policies appear to have "worked," strongly reducing Muslim immigration and travel to the United States." (David Bier, Muslim Ban? Fewer Muslim Refugees, Immigrants, And Travelers Enter U.S, Cato at Liberty, December 12, 2017.

Syria and changed its name to Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Isis or Isil). The following year, Isis overran large swathes of northern and western Iraq, proclaimed the creation of a “caliphate”, and became known as “Islamic State”. A subsequent advance into areas controlled by Iraq's Kurdish minority, and the killing or enslaving of thousands of members of the Yazidi religious group, prompted the US-led coalition to begin air strikes on IS positions in Iraq in August 2014. As IS is now being forced out of Iraq and Syria, another problem is the likely resurgence of hostilities between rival groups. Already Iraqi forces have pushed the Kurds back from land they took during the fight against IS around Kirkuk.³⁶

Islam between the Culture of Domination and the Culture of Rebellion

In their attempts to keep oil resources in Islamic countries under their economic and political control, the West has decided to cultivate good relationships with authoritarian and corruption-prone regimes. By establishing close relationships with autocratic regimes in Islamic countries, the West hopes to reduce the power of GIRMM and thereby encourage the development of liberal democracy in these countries. Such policies will soon prove to be disastrous for both the development of democracy in Islamic countries and for further relationships between the West and the Islamic world.

The political and military support that the West provides to authoritarian and vicious regimes in these countries has an increasing detrimental effect on liberal and democratic movements in the Islamic world, which is moving ever closer to GIRMM. Such a policy and strategy of the West toward Islamic oil rich countries has turned the poorer part of the Islamic influence on governments in poor Islamic countries. Thus a new coalition between GIRMM and the new IRMs has become increasingly visible. The struggle for profit and political power has destroyed any possibility for the democratization of Islamic countries.

³⁶“Despite an appearance by Bush at a mosque after 9/11 to show he didn't hold all Muslims responsible, his administration proceeded to do exactly that: military trials for civilians, secret prisons, the detention of hundreds of Muslim men without charge, the torture and harsh interrogation of detainees and the invasions of two Muslim-majority countries” (The Challenge of Being a Muslim in post- 9/11 America, The Guardian, Friday, 9. September 2011.) President Trump promised to “prioritize” Christian refugees, and he has done so, not by increasing their numbers—the number of Christian refugees has declined as well—but by decreasing Muslim admissions. (David Bier, Muslim Ban? Fewer Muslim Refugees, Immigrants, And Travelers Enter U.S, Cato at Liberty, December 12, 2017)

The coalition between authoritarian regimes in Islamic countries and Western governments has been encouraged since the 9/11 terrorist attack. This coalition will further deepen the gap between illiterate, poor and desperate people and powerful corrupt state bureaucracy in Islamic countries. This will be a closed circle of poverty, misery, rebellion and violence, used by GIRMM in their struggle for power in poor Islamic countries.³⁷

In this coalition of Western governments and the ruling autocratic regimes in Islamic countries, in order to prevent GIRMM from taking over power, the right of the West to be the protector of democracy in the Islamic world would be destroyed.

The conflict between GIRMM and Western governments is growing into the most powerful challenge to human rights and freedoms, and is currently one of the greatest threats to further interactions between Islamic and Western civilizations.

Today, GIRMM serve the hegemonic pretensions of Western countries, as justification for their military intervention in Islamic countries in order to prevent GIRMM from taking over power there. On the other hand, the pretensions of Western countries to control the economic and political processes and prevent political changes in Islamic countries will provide the “legitimate” basis for GIRMM actions. This conflict is going to be a “closed circle of violence” against fundamental human rights and freedoms, leading to the affirmation and domination of the “culture of violence” in relationships between the West and Islam.

Global structural changes have caused dramatic changes in both the Western world and the Islamic community. Can these changes affect the identity of the relationship between Islam and the West? This issue is essentially an indication of the political and cultural tensions that are now appearing in the interaction between the globalization process and Islam. However, this question also gives rise to the need for cooperation between the West and the Islamic world.

The globalization process has fundamentally changed the way of the life and traditions in the Islamic community from Morocco to Indonesia, from Gambia to Uzbekistan, dramatically altering the relationship between groups and individuals, introducing a new sensibility and creativity in relationships between social groups as well as individuals themselves. The possibility of maintaining frequent communication between individuals and groups, by using mobile phones, the Internet, fax, satellites, cable TV,

³⁷I (<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034>, 28. November, 2017).

Facebook, Twitter, and Skype, combined with the cheaper and faster movement of people from one region to another, significantly changing people's way of thinking and dramatically influencing their traditional values system, demands a new social and political organization of Islamic communities. This has automatically led to changes in the nature of the relationship between Islam and the West.

The necessity of global economic and political cooperation intensifies the question of cultural identity in the global environment.³⁸ Concern for the preservation of group identity is manifested in the form of fear of the subordinated economic, cultural and political position of the group in the globalization process. In Islam, this fear produces dramatic political demands indicating the need for integration in the global Islamic community. This claim opens up a new dimension of the internal political crisis between the government and society in Islamic countries. This inner conflict between state and society in the Islamic world is of a different nature to that between state and society in the West. The tendency of Islam to be integrated into a single Islamic community is the most controversial dimension of globalization processes today. These processes produce one of the most profound "crises of state identity" in the Islamic world along with the "crisis of identity of the relations between Islam and the West".

One group of commentators see Islam as the greatest threat to the future development of Western civilization and global peace. Democratization in Islamic countries, based on the majority vote (which in Western political doctrine is considered the main yardstick of democratization of society) is seen as the "democratic enthronement of extremely undemocratic regimes" and of fundamentalist forces in Islamic countries.³⁹ In the light of such beliefs the rapid growth of the Muslim population in the world and the fast-growing Islamic minorities in Europe and the United States are considered as a great threat to Western civilization.

These commentators refuse to link the growth of radicalism in Islamic countries with the model of production, political structure of society and

³⁸"Global entertainment companies shape understandings and dreams of ordinary citizens, wherever they live. It is no wonder to see a shepherd, in the middle of nowhere, humming a Michael Jackson tune! Are local Islamic cultures, then, inevitably falling victim to a global "consumer" culture? When one considers the distribution of indigenous forms of representation like the Friday-prayer sermon, one should be optimistic". (Wang Jieru (2003), *Options of Cultural Identification in Constructing Globalization: Global Culture or Cultural Globalization?*, Kunming Institute of Botany, Chinese Academy of Sciences)

³⁹Judit Miler (1993), *The Challenge of Radical Islam*, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, SBN News Arab Spring Push for Islamic Caliphate.

the difficult economic and social position of the population in most of these countries. In their perception of Islamic radicalism the main threat stems from the growing prosperity of Islamic countries, primarily in oil-exporting countries, which encourages more reminiscence on the part of the ruling elite in the Islamic world of the great Islamic empire. Kuwait, Qatar, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey are the most prosperous Islamic countries where radical Islam has great political power and influence on the political and social structure, thus providing legitimacy to reject the hypothesis that the socioeconomic status of the population has a defining role in the radicalization of Islam.

In support of the thesis that the radicalization of Islam cannot be linked with poverty and a lack of democratic institutions in Islamic countries, these writers use statistical data on the high degree of radicalization of Islamic immigrant populations in Europe and the US, which reportedly enjoy a higher standard of living than the average living standards in the countries of migration as well as all the benefits of an institutionalized democratic society. This group of authors indicate that the radicalization of Islam is primarily associated with the rapid accumulation of capital in Islamic countries in the early 1970s during the big oil boom which encouraged the phenomenon of historical reminiscences of the time of Islamic domination and the rule of the Ottoman Empire.

The large accumulation of “petro dollars” has improved free market capitalism and liberal democracy in Islamic countries, leading to an increase in living standards in the Islamic world. The spread of liberal democracy, the free market and the improvement of living standards in Islamic countries will inspire rivalry between Islam and the West. This will be one of the fundamental causes of the strengthening of political Islam and the increase of Islamic radicalism.⁴⁰

Another group of scholars reject the validity of this thesis. The hypothesis that the spreading of market capitalism, liberal democracy and improving the living standards of the population in Islamic countries encourages the radicalization of Islam, leading to a conflict between Islam and the West, is a thesis that cannot survive any serious criticism. First of all, it is hard to talk about the dominance of the free market and the capitalist mode of production and liberal democracy in Islamic countries. The growth of gross national income in some Islamic countries in terms of economic rents (oil wells) is unable to secure the dominance of the capitalist mode of

⁴⁰Daniel Pipes (2002), *God and Mammon: Does Poverty Cause Militant Islam*, National Interest, winter 2002.

production, or the increasing living standards of the population in Islamic countries. The failure to create a stable middle class in these countries leads to the absence of potential economic competition between Islam and the West. The radicalization of Islam is a problem arising from the mode of production in Islamic countries which causes dramatic problems in the relationship between the state and society in these countries. “Another aspect of the weakness of the state is the social-economic one as the Arab state has failed to support and sustain the masses and their basic needs. This evidenced by the stunning fact that despite Arab oil wealth, the per capita GDP for all the Arab states grew by less than 0.5 percent annually from 1980 to 2004. As for industrialization, Arab countries were less industrialized in 2007 than in 1970, and unemployment among the young, which is over 60 percent for those under the age of 25, is among the highest in the world. The overall poverty rate is almost 50 percent”.⁴¹

Since global capital has penetrated these countries, with the pre-capitalist model of production, via the global market rather than through capitalist production, the laws of the capitalist mode of production have a limited influence on economic development. In this case the influence of the capitalist mode of production is limited to the level of profit and the amount of rent. The “relations of production” in these countries remain outside this influence. Under these conditions, the laws of the capitalist mode of production have been developed into a basic playback feudal structure and the “global capitalist market becomes a mechanism by which the feudal lords maintain control over certain production resources and thus ensure the domination and exploitation of people and also the means through which they resist the subjection of production resources to capitalist relations of production.”⁴² A high percent of the population in Islamic countries continue to live in poverty.⁴³

The call for social and economic reform was regularly followed by the radicalization of the Islamic society, which only gave the poor masses the opportunity to respond to state repression. Educated younger generations, mainly technical intelligence, have the option either to support domestic pro-Western political elites, or to remain on the economic and social margins. Such a position of young and educated generations in the Islamic

⁴¹David Bukay, “Arab Spring” Delusions, ACDemocracy (American Center for Democracy), December 20, 2013).

⁴²Harold Wolpe (1980), *The Articulation of Modes of Production*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.

⁴³Around 1.7 billion people are living below the poverty line. Amongst them 44 percent are residing in Muslim countries. (The Nation, Saturday 29. June, 2013).

world will lead them to claim the social and political reform of Islamic society, calling for the capitalist mode of production and a new structure of the relationship between the state and society in Islamic countries. The inability to implement these economic, social and political reforms produces high levels of radicalism in Islamic countries, resulting in the radicalization of the relationship between the West and Islam.

Global Production and the New Matrix of “Global Islamic Terrorism”

In traditional scholars’ debate, global terrorism is predominantly seen as an issue with a religious and cultural, predominantly Islamic, background. However, this problem is more complex than perceived at first glance. The issue of global terrorism is essentially linked to structural changes in the global economy, rather than to the references of religion and culture following the collapse of the Soviet Union, as has been noted in many scholarly interpretations.

This chapter begins with the hypothesis that the critical aspect of this issue refers to the relationship between government and society in the era of globalization, rather than being related to a sense of belonging to civilizations of distinct cultural, historical and religious diversities and identities.

For a better understanding of the link between globalization and global violence, which in the literature is mainly considered as Islamic terrorism, it is very important to observe the influence of globalization on the cultural and political structure of Islamic society. It is also necessary to study how the traditional constituents of Islam (Islamic law, tradition, philosophy, culture etc.) have an effect on global forces with diverse conditions producing unique configurations of the global economic, political and cultural matrix, and actions in the contemporary world. It seems that democracy and Islam reflect common contradictions and tensions between crucial constitutive forces which challenge each other in the present stage of globalization.

From these perspectives, the globalization process has prompted heated debate which is directly or indirectly linked to the relationships between global development, Islamic democracy and global terrorism. “Secular democracies were developed on the basis of three distinct categories: liberty, equality and fraternity. There are many overlaps between these secular categories and social and moral principles of Islamic divine law: pursuing justice through social cooperation and mutual assistance; establishing a non-autocratic/consultative method of governance; and

institutionalising mercy and compassion and social interactions. The principles of liberty, equality and fraternity are addressed in the Qur'an where it says that 'God created people different and grouped them into nations and tribes so that they would come to know one another.' This provision of the Qur'an indicates the need for harmony and equality among people, groups, tribes and nations in order to achieve justice as the divine imperative and represents the sovereignty of the divine (49:13). Such signs of compatibility between Islamic divine law and secularism largely disappear in interpretations of the divine law by human agents that raise the question of the appointment, removal and power of the ruler (Caliph), who implements the will of God on earth and determines the role of law in Islam. Hence, the main problem is not the Islamic law as such and rather the human interpretation of Islamic divine law and its application."⁴⁴

The dominant controversy in this debate on the phenomenon of globalization, Islamic democratization and global terrorism is the failure to articulate the relationship between the consistency of globalization and global terrorism. Many scholars fail to perceive the contradictions between globalization and the economic and societal organization of the Islamic state in the era of globalization. These contradictions, which involve many disagreements and misinterpretations between technological development and Islamic law, philosophy, culture and tradition, generate the divergence between globalization and Islam, thus resulting in this conflict between democracy and Islam.

In particular, this debate depicts Islamic anger as the inherent resistance of Islamic culture and religion to market forces, science, and technology, and consequently to democracy and Western culture as well. Likewise, these debates fail to observe how new technologies and the new global economy may serve as effective tools for the global reform of the societal organization of Islamic society, encouraging the economic and technological development of Islamic states with a new social and political vision, leaving Islamic tradition, religion and culture untouched.

This new phenomenon reflects conditions of security which are shaped by economic scarcity, which prevailed almost everywhere until recently, and has changed the social and political environment in poor Islamic countries around the globe. In this circumstance one of the key functions of religion in these countries is the need to provide a sense of survival and

⁴⁴Nedžad Basic, *Secularism and Islamic Law, in Culture and Human Rights; The Wrocław Commentaries*, Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston and AARCult Media GmbH Köln, 2016, p. 268

security in an insecure environment, rather than provoke conflict with Western civilization as has been interpreted in many scholars' opinions. Physical as well as economic and cultural insecurity intensify this need.

The strong sense of disparity in the distribution of global wealth has created a growing "solidarity of the poor" in Islamic countries, cemented by religious and cultural ties. This solidarity includes the inherent perception that the unification of the Muslim World is Muslims' primary mission if they want to escape further scarcity and disgrace in the globalization process.

Observing the relationships between local government, MNCs, international institutions and the global market, the issue of global Islamic terrorism should be focused on a new type of "government-society conflict" which can be understood as a rational social-economic phenomenon in the globalization process. The actions of global Islamic terrorism do not occur spontaneously as activities related to protecting only the spiritual order and social life in Islamic society, but rather require mobilization and action groups directed towards changing the model of the national and regional economic and political environment. This requires interaction between mobilized groups and the government, meaning that the bargaining process between mobilized groups and governments is crucial in resolving this issue.

In this bargaining process between mobilized groups and governments, consideration should be given to how new technologies and the new global economy may serve as effective tools for the global reform of the societal reorganization of Islamic countries, promoting the economic and technological development of Islamic society with a new social and political vision, leaving the tradition, religion and culture of Islam untouched.

The bargaining process between "mobilized groups" and governments in Islamic countries should be followed by a concept a new system of governance to reduce poverty, inequality, corruption, bribery, and unemployment within context of global economy, that it includes following 6 moves: *Building of Welfare Society*: focus on links between local government/elite, global market and local social conditions for every day life; *Building Secure State*: focus on links between local government/elites—power and Social privileges—governance—administrative control and command over the means of coercion; *Building Open Society*: focus on links between global market, local government/elites and local institutions and international institutions and NGO; *Building Democratic State*: focus on links between local government/elites, and global democratic institutions and

global market; *Building Self-Identity Society*: focus on links between local government/elites–global market–local cultural & traditional system of values; *Building Self-Changeable Government*: focus on links between local democratic institutions, traditional form of social power, social stratification of the society and influence of global market and global institutions on diversification of internal traditional social power.

This bargaining process between “mobilized groups” and governments in Islamic countries could help to transform the global network of terror into a global political movement capable significantly contributing to democratic development and creating an new links between government and local society in Islamic countries as well as between Western and Islamic civilizations.